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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS 
Present: 
Hon. Maria G. Rosa, Justice 
GEORGE PHILLIPS, 
Petitioner, 
-against-
TINA M. STANFORD, CHAIR OF THE NEW YORK 
STATEi PAROLE BOARD, 
Respondent. 
DECISION, ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT 
Index No. 52579119 
The following papers were read on this Article 78 petition: 
NOTICE OF PETITION 
PETITION 
EXHIBITS A - F 
ANSWfR AND RETURN 
EXHIBITS 1 -1 3 
REPLY AFFIRMATION 
This is an Article 78 proceeding in which Petitioner challenges a determination denying him 
discretionary parole release. In January 2000 Petitioner was sentenced after trial in Queens County 
to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years incarceration after being convicted of two counts of Rape in 
the First Degree, one count of Sodomy and three counts of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. 
Petition,er then entered an Alford plea (without admission of guilt) in Nassau County to charges of 
Rape in the First Degree, Sodomy inthe First Degree and Attempted Sodomyin the First Degree 
resulting in an aggregate sentence of 1 0 to 2Wyears to run concurrently with the Queens County 
sentences. Petitioner was accused of cruising for teenage victims on the Nassau and Queens border, 
· forcing them into his vehicle by displayinga weapon and/ot making verbalthreats and then driving 
· to . mor~ secluded areas where rapes, sodomy and sexual abuses occurred. The challenged 
determination was niade on October 9, 2018 at Petitioner's second appearance before the parole 
board. As of that date he was 54 )'ears old and had served 22 years in prison. 
" Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board ofParo1e is required to 
consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole. 
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See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2nd Dept. 2010). The parole board must 
also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he willli ve 
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for 
the law." 9 NYCRR 8002.1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory 
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v. 
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2"d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the 
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d I 099, 1100 (3'd Dept. 
201 0). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny release 
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 947; King v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1 st Dept. 1993). Moreover, while the board need 
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each 
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). finally, the board 
must inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for denial of parole and "[s]uchreasons 
shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v. Evans, 
83 AD 3d 719 (2"d Dept. 20 I l ). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is 
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial 
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd. 
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980). 
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new 
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have 
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to 
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the 
board in taking this approach when making paro le determinations, the amendment required the 
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's 
rehabifitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramirez v. Evans, 118 AD 3d 707 (2"d 
Dept. 20 14). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS (Conectional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A COMP AS assessment was 
prepared in connection with Petitioner's October 9, 2018 appearance before the Parole Board. 
Petitioner claims that the Parole Board's decision was improperly based solely on the 
seriousness of his offenses, failed to adequately detail the reasons for the denial of the parole, failed 
to provide a justification for departing from reliance upon his low COMP AS scores and denied him 
his due process rights. Petitioner submitted a parole packet prior to the hearing that included 
evidence of successful completion of numerous programs including Aggression Replacement 
Training ("ART"), the Large Print Vocational Education program, Transitional Services I and II, 
Legal Research and several religious programs. He further submitted numerous letters of support 
from attorneys currently representing him in connection with his claims of innocence, family 
members and friends. He also produced letters extending him employment offers upon release. His 
COMP AS risk assessment instrument found him a low risk in all categories and stated he had a high 
school diploma, a skill or trade, family support and specific employment plans with no history of 
substance abuse. 
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Petitioner's parole hearing began with a significant discussion pertaining to his claims of 
innocence. He initially requested an adjournment of the hearing based upon an alleged pending 
application. The Parole Board properly recognized that it was required to presume Petitioner was 
guilty of the offenses for which he was convicted. The Board then recounted the factual allegations 
underlying Petitioner's crimes and made an inquiry as to how he could have been convicted in light 
of his adamant claims of innocence. A discussion then ensued about Petitioner's failure to 
participate in a sex offender treatment program. Petitioner indicated that while he could sign up for 
the program, he bel ieved that maintaining his innocence would result in his discharge. The Board 
then made inquiry into his release plans. Petitioner stated that he intended to reside with his elderly 
parents and had offers of employment in the medical diagnostic field doing administrative work with 
an alternative plan to work for a financial consultant. Petitioner noted that he had a bachelor's 
degree in economics and business that he obtained prior to his incarceration, stating that he had 
owned a commercial real estate company for fifteen years. Petitioner asserted that he would not 
need any financial support upon release. The Board acknowledged Petitioner 's low COMP AS scores 
but disagreed with the low score for history of violence based on the violent nature of his crimes. 
It acknowledged his program accomplishments, lack of any significant disciplinary record and work 
history while incarcerated. The Board noted that his behavior while incarcerated was commendable 
while simultaneously stating that it was required to consider the serious nature of his crimes of 
conviction. It further acknowledged receiving responses from the sentencing j udge and the district 
attorney's office. 
Fallowing the hearing the Parole Board issued a short decision denying parole. The decision 
stated that if Petitioner were released, there was a reasonable probability he would not live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law and that "release would be incompatible with the welfare 
and safety of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect 
for the law." The decision stated that the Board considered the required statutory factors along with 
Petitioner's institutional adjustment including discipline, program participation, risk and needs 
assessment and his needs for successful re-entry into the community. The Board stated, however, 
that more compelling was the serious nature of the rape, sodomy and sexual assault charges for 
which he was convicted. It further cited a prior conviction for public lewdness, stating that the 
instant offenses represented a serious escalation of violent and criminal behaviors. It noted his 
positive programming and limited disciplinary record. Stating that the panel weighed and 
considered the results of his risks and needs assessment and low scores indicated therein, it found 
that the "serious and lifelong pain and suffering [petitioner caused) his many female victims" 
outweighed these factors. The decision recounted that these victims were abducted, forced into a 
vehicle, threatened with a weapon or physical harm and then sexually assaulted. Based on the 
foregoing, the Board determined discretionary release was not warranted. 
This court's role is not to usurp the decision making authority statutorily vested in the Board 
of Parole. It only has the authority to determine whether the Board considered the relevant statutory 
factors in making its final determination. See Matter of Russo, supra. In conducting such review, 
the court considers the parole interview and entire record before it but ultimately must assess 
whether the parole board's decision is arbitrary or affected by an error of law. Here, the sole facts 
3 
3 of 5 
. 
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29 
INDEX NO. 2019 -52579 
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/01/2019 
set forth in the Board's written 's decision supporting parole denial are a recitation of Petitioner's 
crimes of conviction, the violent nature of such crimes, the impacts they had on the victims and an 
assertion that the instant offenses represent an escalation of violent and criminal behavior based upon 
prior convictions for disorderly conduct and public lewdness. These facts and the Board's assertion 
that the violent nature of Petitioner's offenses warranted a higher score for "history of violence" on 
his COMP AS assessment are all directly or indirectly related to his crimes of conviction. A Parole 
Board is permitted to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of the offenses committed, but may not 
deny parole based solely on the seriousness of such offenses. See Ferrante v. Stanford, 172 AD2d 
31 (2"d Dept 2019); Rossakis v. NYS Bd of Parole, 146 AD3d 22 (2016). While the Board 
concluded that Petitioner's release would be incompatible with the welfare and safety of society 
because he would likely not live and remain at liberty without violating the law, the only facts cited 
in support of this conclusion were based on the conduct underlying Petitioner's offenses. 
An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason norregard 
to the facts. See Matter of Wooley v. NYS Dept. ofCorr. Servs, 15 NY3d 275 (201 0). Here, other 
than citing facts related to petitioner's offenses, the facts the parole board articulated do not support 
its ultimate determination. Petitioner's COMP AS scores, program participation, disciplinary history, 
employment history and release plans all support a finding contrary to that made by the parole board. 
It is not the function of this court to review the record to determine whether or not it, taken as a 
whole, would lend rational support to the Board's final determination. The Board is obligated to 
articulate facts underlying its ultimate determination to enable this court to review whether it 
rationally applied those facts to the requisite statutory factors. The Board in this case failed to 
articulate such facts and thus its decision lacks a rational basis. While there may be factors in the 
record supporting its ultimate determination, it is the obligation of the Board to state those facts and 
its reliance thereon in its decision. 
Petitioner also demonstrates tbat the Board failed to comply with 9 NYCRR §8002.2(a). 
That rule requires a Parole Board making a release determination to be guided by an inmates's risks 
and needs scores as generated by a risk assessment instrument. If the Board 's determination to deny 
release departs from a risks and needs assessment score, it is required to specify any scale in such 
assessment from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure. See 9 
NYCRR §8002. The COMPAS assessment prepared in connection with Petitioner's parole 
appearance gave him the lowest possible rating in categories for risk of felony violence, re-arrest, 
absconding, for criminal involvement and found he was unlikely to have issues with family support 
or significant financial problems upon release. The Parole Board finding that discretionary release 
would not be compatible with the welfare of society directly contradicts these scores. In accordance 
with 9 NYCRR §8002.2, the Board was thus required to articulate with specificity the particular 
scales in petitioner's COMPAS assessment from which it was departing and provide an 
individualized reason for such departures. The Board's conclusory statement that it considered 
statutory factors, including his institutional adjustment, discipline, program participation and needs 
for successful re-entry in finding that the discretionary release would not be compatible with the 
welfare of society fails to meet this standard. As such, its determination denying parole release was 
also affected an error of Jaw. Based on the foregoing, it is 
4 
4 of 5 
iNbkx Mo. 2619 -52579 
•• NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/01/2019 
; 
ORDERED that the petition to vac;ate and annul the October 9, 2018 determination denying 
parole release as arbitrary and as affected by an error of Jaw is granted to the extent that the Board 
of Parole shall conduct a de novo parole release interview within sixty days of the date of this 
decision and order. The court rejects Petitioner's claim that the denial of parole was in violation of 
his constitutional due process rights. There is no inherent constitutional right to parole and a Parole 
Board's discretionary determination to deny parole release does not implicate a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest. See Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd. of Parofe, 50 NY2d at 76; Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2nd Cir. 2001). Petitioner's claims of actual innocence have no bearing on this 
court's determination as such claims were not relevant to the Court's review of the Parole Board's 
challenged determination. Nor did the court consider Petitioner's pro se letter and exhibits 
submitted in reply.As Petitioner is represented by counsel who submitted an affirmation in reply, 
he is not permitted to submit a second pro se reply. 
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court 
Dated:~~ 1<iS\ 2019 
Poughkeepsie, New York 
ENTER: 
MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C. 
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Pursuant to CPLR §5513, an appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days after service by a 
party ,upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its 
entry, e.xcept that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgmetit or order and written ndtice 
of its entry, the appeal must betaken within thirty days thereof. 
Kathy Manley, Esq. 
26 Dinmore Road 
Selkirk, NY 12158 
Office of the Attorney General 
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401 
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 I 
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